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Net Neutrality and the European Union’s
Copyright Directive for the Digital Single
Market
BY NATHAN GUZÉ**
Abstract: The European Union’s Copyright Directive for the
Digital Single Market should cause concern for net neutrality advocates.
This article casts a critical gaze at Article 17 (previously Article 13) of
this new Directive. It chronicles the Directive’s life: starting as a
reaction to the perceived inadequate copyright protections provided by
the previous Information Society Copyright Directive through to its
then-present status circa May 2019. Next, net neutrality is defined, and
its benefits and detriments are weighed to ultimately determine the
policy is desirable. Article 17’s call for eliminating safe-harbor
provisions for content hosts and its call for content filters signal
opposition to net neutrality, despite the European Union’s supposed
support for this policy. This new Copyright Directive seeks to support
all creators, but it will only further entrench support for remunerative
efforts towards those who can finance enforcement efforts: the mostfamous creators and performers. The Directive’s enactment sets up a
potentially bleak future for creativity on the internet – a cornerstone of
the web that users have come to expect – and set in place an internet for
the haves, not the have-nots. Ultimately, the Digital Single Market
Directive is not net neutral and not in the general consumer’s best
interest.

*

* Nathan Guzé, J.D. is a 2020 graduate of Loyola Law School. He also holds an M.A. in Music
Industry Administration from California State University Northridge and a B.A. in Music from
the University of California Riverside. This paper is a student note written primarily in 2018-19. I
would like to thank my fiancé Chelsea McCants for her support throughout law school, Professor
Atik for his advice and guidance on this paper, and the rest of the Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Review for their assistance in this note’s creation. It was
wonderful to work with you all for two years.
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INTRODUCTION
Copyright laws are essential to incentivizing artists, authors,
inventors, and other visionaries to engage in creative pursuits and to
share the fruits of their labor with the rest of society. These laws
provide peace of mind to these creators and copyright owners by
ensuring their compensation and control over the works and punishment
for infringers. In 2018, the European Union’s governing bodies
proposed a new Copyright Directive for the Digital Single Market
(“DSM Copyright Directive”). If adopted by its member states, the
directive will regulate the enforcement against copyright infringement
and the unauthorized use of copyrighted material in the online digital
1
2
world. This directive includes the controversial Article 13, which has
been dubbed the “meme ban” colloquially and the “value gap”
provision officially. Catchy names aside, the implementation of this
article could change how the internet functions around the world.
A. A Brief History of the Copyright Directive for the Digital Single
Market
In the late twentieth century, the World Intellectual Property
Organization (“WIPO”) called for changes in member-state copyright
3
laws. The United States provided initial drafts and spearheaded
4
negotiations for the influential WIPO Internet Treaties. These proposed
changes were forward-thinking and anticipated the many new and

1. James Vincent, EU Approves Controversial Copyright Directive, Including Internet
‘Link Tax’ and ‘Upload Filter’, VERGE (Sep. 12, 2018, 7:12 AM), https://www.theverge.com/
2018/9/12/17849868/eu-internet-copyright-reform-article-11-13-approved (report on the Sept.
2018 European Union approval of new Copyright Directive language. Criticizing Articles 11 and
13 and states that a vote is likely in January 2019).
2. Note that the European Parliament’s approved language of the Copyright Directive for
the Digital Single Market has renumbered the value gap provision/meme ban from Article 13 to
Article 17. For the sake of continuity with external materials, it shall be referred to as Article 13
in this article. See Resolution of 26, March 2019 on the Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, EUR. PARL. DOC.
(COM 0593), 121 (2019).
3. Mihály Ficsor, Copyright for the Digital Era: The WIPO Internet Treaties, 21 COLUM.
- VLA J.L. & ARTS 197, 197–99 (1997) (discussing the negotiation process behind the WIPO
Copyright Treaty (“WCT”) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”) and the
subsequent agreements. Providing the unique identifier “WIPO Internet Treaties”).
4. Mihály Ficsor, The WIPO “Internet Treaties” The United States as the Driver: The
United States as the Main Source of Obstruction — As Seen by an Anti-Revolutionary Central
European, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 17, 20–27 (2006) (discusses the United States’
role in implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties and how that affected the adoption of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act).
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changing roles copyright would play in the internet age. Ultimately, the
signing of the treaties resulted in the United States adopting the Digital
5
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) in 1998. This act made the
copying and dissemination of creative digital works found in the form
6
of computer files unlawful. Furthermore, it created ‘safe-harbor’ laws,
which allow for-profit online content sharing service providers to avoid
liability for hosting user-uploaded content that contains or is comprised
7
of copyrighted materials.
The European Union initially adopted a similar provision under
their “Directive on Copyright in the Information Society” (“InfoSoc
Directive”) that brought it in compliance with the WIPO Internet
8
Treaties to which it signed. However, the resulting European Union
Copyright law came under scrutiny as the Centre for European Policy
Studies (“CEPS”), many European copyright holders, and content
owners claimed it did not go far enough to protect copyright holder
9
rights. These critics felt as though the InfoSoc Directive failed to
10
sufficiently protect copyright-protected works in modern Europe. In a
study, CEPS determined that although the InfoSoc Directive aligned
European Union legislation with international law, the directive failed
on multiple fronts; including strengthening intellectual property
protection in light of emerging technological developments, reducing
the existing disparities between national legal systems, and ensuring an
adequate level of remuneration and compensation of authors and
11
performers. Today, computers with internet access can easily find and
download songs, videos, articles, photographs, or other creative works
5. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105–304, § 512, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2877.
8. European Commission Press Release IP/01/528, Commission Welcomes Adoption of
the Directive on Copyright in the Information Society by the Council (Apr. 9, 2001) (press
release that announced European Union’s passing of earlier version of Copyright directive.
Briefly discusses some of the law’s provisions); WIPO Copyright Treaty Contracting Parties,
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_
id=16 (last visited Aug. 28, 2019) (shows which countries are signatories to WCT. Shows when
European Union and United States both signed on to the treaty).
9. See generally ANDREA RENDA ET AL., THE IMPLEMENTATION, APPLICATION AND
EFFECTS OF THE EU DIRECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (2015), https://
www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/SR120_0.pdf (identifying problems with the European
Union’s earlier Copyright directive. It found that its similar-to-DMCA provisions were
inadequately protecting European Union copyrights and called for a new European Union
copyright directive).
10. Id.
11. Id. at ii, iii.
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its user desires. While it has recently become easier to legitimately
obtain and use copyrighted works via subscription streaming services,
one-time downloads, and other methods, it is still not difficult to
download the work without authorization from or payment to its rightsholder.
The European Union’s DSM Copyright Directive seeks to address
these issues that worry policy makers and copyright holders. However,
it brings to a head an important policy consideration that is essential for
any society to acknowledge in today’s internet-age: ensuring that
authors’, artists’, publishers’, and other creative and technology-based
industry members’ concerns in protecting their works are balanced with
the consumers’ rights in the internet-age. This note seeks to bring that
consideration to the DSM Copyright Directive.
B. An Examination of Net Neutrality
Net neutrality must first be considered before the new directive can
12
be examined. Not one widely-accepted definition for this policy exists.
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “net neutrality” as “the idea,
principle, or requirement that internet service providers (“ISPs”) should
or must treat all internet data as the same regardless of its kind, source,
13
or destination.” At the very least, a widely accepted definition must
include “the general principles that owners of the networks that
compose and provide access to the internet should not control how
consumers lawfully use that network, and they should not be able to
14
discriminate against content provider access to that network.”
This note will use “net neutrality” to describe the concept of the
internet as a place for the free and open exchange of information. It is
achieved through a network owner’s “neutral” approach to handling and
15
delivering web data, no matter where it comes from or where it goes.
This thereby requires internet service providers, content hosts, and other
online gate-keepers to not prohibit, filter, or redirect users from most of
their desired search results. It also requires governments and societies to
treat network owners as mere conduits of data exchange who should be
severely limited in their liability only regarding what data is transferred.
12. ANGELE A. GILROY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40616, THE NET NEUTRALITY
DEBATE: ACCESS TO BROADBAND NETWORKS 1 (2019).
13. Net Neutrality, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/net%20neutrality (last visited Apr. 11, 2019).
14. GILROY, supra note 12, at 1.
15. Seriously troublesome materials such as child pornography are exempted from the
neutrality requirement of this definition.

FINAL_FOR_JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

Net Neutrality and the EU’s Copyright Directive

10/7/2020 6:49 AM

67

Consumers have much to gain under a net neutral internet. Such an
internet preserves consumers’ rights to be protected from network
owners’ control of data by ensuring that they cannot filter content
16
without a court order. By prohibiting the speech filtration that
characterizes monopolized and oligopolized internet communications, a
net neutral internet would also foster free and democratic
17
communications. Further, a net neutral internet would encourage
competition and innovation by allowing the quality of websites and
web-services to dictate their success rather than mere deals with
18
network owners.
However, net neutrality sacrifices some concepts that consumers
may find desirable. In response to market demands, network owners
may wish to offer various price levels for different service levels that
consumers may find desirable in their internet use. This is often
presented by offering different service packages that allow consumers
access to different categories of online services depending on which
19
package or packages are selected. Because more consumers are able to
buy in to less expensive partial internet access, network owners may
then continue to invest in networks and internet infrastructure for the
20
benefit of consumers.
Implementation of net neutrality principles could also lead to
increased costs for internet access that could effectively block access to
21
it by those who cannot afford it. Many internet service providers
provide partial internet access to the poor for free or at reduced costs
22
under a ‘zero rating’ concept. Under this concept, internet service
16. PETER PHILLIPS, CENSORED 2007 at 34 (2006).
17. Lawrence Lessig and Robert W. McChesney, No Tolls on the Internet, WASH. POST
(Jun. 8, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/07/AR200606
0702108.html.
18. SaveTheInternet.com Frequently Asked Questions, FREE PRESS ACTION FUND, https://
web.archive.org/web/20081211200309, http://savetheinternet.com/%3Dfaq (last visited Apr. 12,
2019).
19. See, e.g., Tarifários Móveis Pós-pagos Unlimited, MEO+SMART NET, https://web.
archive.org/web/20171214100904/,
https://www.meo.pt/telemovel/tarifarios/unlimited
(last
visited Apr. 11, 2019).
20. J. Gregory Sidak, What is the Network Neutrality Debate Really About?, 1 INT’L J.
COMM. 377, 384 (2007).
21. Brian Fung, Jesse Jackson is lobbying the FCC against aggressive net neutrality rules,
WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/11/18/
jesse-jackson-is-lobbying-the-fcc-against-aggressive-net-neutrality-rules/?utm_term=.
b6643bbdcddf.
22. Scott Canon, Digital Life: The Trump Path to Free Internet for the Poor, KAN. CITY
STAR (May 19, 2017), https://www.kansascity.com/news/business/technology/article151477557.
html.
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providers accept payment from certain websites and online services in
23
exchange for exemptions from data caps. This would allow poorer
users to use bandwidth-hogging services without exceeding their data
caps, as their data usage for that website or online service has already
24
been paid. However, this can be abused by interests who pay network
owners to only allow consumers to access their content.
C. The Copyright Directive for the Digital Single Market Rejects Net
Neutrality
The European Union’s DSM Copyright Directive is a decision to
reject net neutrality. By mandating an expanse of copyright protections
via content filtration systems and increased liability for network owners,
the European Union is cauterizing a generation’s creative abilities by
denying them the deliberate, legitimate, and fair use of works by other
authors through algorithmic content filters. The potential for abuse is
substantial, as these laws can be used to deny rights to free expression
and speech by restricting access to online data that is essential to
fostering and supporting the creation of original ideas under the guise of
copyright protection.
However, the new proposal is not without its merits. Copyright
laws exist to give creators and rights-holders a chance to profit and
trade their creatively produced works. This new directive seeks to solve
the issue of content piracy, which has perplexed many industries since
the inception of the internet. While some artists and creators seem to
live extravagantly off of their creative successes, there are many others
who remain anonymous because of the ease of access the internet
provides to the more famous works of others. All a consumer needs to
do in order to find the song that is stuck in their head is to search for it
on YouTube or Google, and more often than not they can find the song
for free. Even if there is an official version available that is free or
inexpensive, one may easily find other versions that divert funds and
viewership away from the song’s original author. This has created what
the authors of the copyright directive call “the value-gap,” or the gap
between the money content hosts make from user generated content and

23. Id.; CONSUMER REPORTS, What are broadband data caps and should you be
concerned about them?, (June 24, 2015), https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2015/06/
broadband-data-caps/index.htm (defining “data caps” as “monthly limits on the amount of data
you can use over your Internet connection”).
24. Fung, supra note 21.
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25

the money they pass on to copyright holders. In response to
stakeholders’ requests (such as European copyright holders), and in an
attempt to comply with WIPO international treaty requirements, the
directive contains two major articles that, if passed into member state
national law, would bring substantial changes to European copyright
26
regimes.
First, this article will examine the history behind Article 13 of the
DSM Copyright Directive. It will start by reviewing standards set by the
WIPO in the multilateral ‘Internet Treaties’ signed by the European
Union. It will then consider how the European Union originally
implemented these standards in the InfoSoc Directive. The InfoSoc
Directive’s criticisms will then be examined to see how it gave life to
the DSM Copyright Directive.
Section Two of this article will dive deeper into the concept of ‘net
neutrality’ and its relationship with the DSM Copyright Directive. It
will examine hypotheticals and real world examples of net neutrality
violations in both corporate and government-backed settings. It will
then examine the European Union’s history with net neutrality. These
examinations will help conclude that the DSM Copyright Directive
really is not net neutral.
Section Three will then specifically examine the language of
Article 13 to determine that it is not net neutral. Article 13’s major
provisions are themselves not net neutral, such as the elimination of
safe-harbor provisions and the requirement for content filters.
Section Four will then consider who stands to win and lose under
the DSM Copyright Directive. Determining why this matters will
further prove who the winners and losers are, which will help the reader
understand that important net neutrality interests truly are at stake with
the DSM Copyright Directive’s passage, for the benefit of a select few.
The final section will attempt to predict how the future internet
will look like with the non-net-neutral DSM Copyright Directive
enacted, and whether it is worth passing. Ultimately, this note will make
a case for the importance of at least maintaining the internet’s statusquo, and at most making it more net neutral.

25. Mark Sutherland, Rights-Holders Pile on ‘Value Gap’ Pressure as Article 13 End
Game Nears, MUSIC WEEK (Dec. 14, 2018), http://www.musicweek.com/labels/read/rightsholders-pile-on-value-gap-pressure-as-article-13-end-game-nears/074779 (defining “value gap”).
26. Dave Keating & Peter O’Donnell, Battle on EU Copyright Law Re-opened by
Commission, POLITICO (May 12, 2012, 11:05 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/battle-on-eucopyright-law-re-opened-by-commission/.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY BEHIND THE EUROPEAN UNION’S COPYRIGHT
DIRECTIVE FOR THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET
Both the European Union’s and the United States’ copyright
regimes stem, in part, from their respective agreements to implement
27
what has come to be known as the WIPO “Internet Treaties.” This
consists of two separate treaties: the WIPO Copyright Treaty (“WCT”),
28
and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”). The
European Union and the United States signed these treaties in 1996 and
29
1997, respectively. The United States ratified the treaties in 1999 and
30
they went into effect in 2002. The European Union ratified the treaties
31
a decade later in 2009, and they went into force in 2010.
The WCT was particularly important in setting the foundation for
both the United States’ and the European Union’s current copyright
regimes, as it called for an absolute bar on the circumvention of
32
technological measures that protect copyrighted works. Notably, the
WCT also called for software and databases to be eligible for copyright
33
protection, too. Since the decision in Feist Publications v. Rural
34
Telephone Service Co., the United States has adhered to this WCT
provision by providing copyright protection to “factual compilation[s]
[such as databases] if it features an original selection or arrangement of
facts, but the copyright is limited to the particular selection or
arrangement. In no event may copyright extend to the facts
35
themselves.” While the European Union provides similar copyright
36
protections for creatively arranged databases, it contrastingly provides
sui generis protection rights for databases “which show that there has
been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in
37
either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents . . . .”

27. RENDA ET AL., supra note 9, at 2.
28. WIPO Copyright Treaty Contracting Parties, World Intell. Prop. Org., https://www.
wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=16 (last visited Aug. 28, 2019); WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 5, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997).
29. WIPO Copyright Treaty Contracting Parties, supra note 28.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. WIPO Copyright Treaty, arts. 11-12, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121, 4.
33. Id. at arts. 2-3.
34. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1991).
35. Id. at 350-51.
36. Directive 1996/9, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on
the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 3, 1 (EC).
37. Id. at 9.
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The WPPT was notable in that it granted protections to performers
and producers of phonographs. It called for the extension of “moral
38
rights” to performers and their fixed and unfixed performances. Moral
rights are an author’s non-economic right to claim authorship of a work
and to object to any sort of negative modification of their work that
would prejudice their honor or reputation, even after the economic
39
rights have been transferred to a new owner. This treaty also gave
performers and producers alike the right to reproduce, distribute, and
40
rent out their performances and phonographic recordings for a term of
fifty years either after the performance became fixed or when the
41
phonograph was published. While these rights for producers and
performers were certainly groundbreaking, arguably, the most
noteworthy aspects of the WPPT can be found in Articles 18 and 19.
Similar to Articles 11 and 12 of the WCT, Articles 18 and 19 of the
WPPT called for an absolute bar on the circumvention of technological
42
measures that protect copyrighted works, and for the creation of
43
adequate legal remedies and protection against such circumventions.
In order to align its laws with WIPO multilateral treaty obligations,
increase intellectual property protection and profitability, and create
uniform European copyright laws, the European Union Parliament first
44
passed copyright laws for the digital era in its 2001 InfoSoc. Before
the InfoSoc Directive’s implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties,
member state governments implemented their own individual copyright
laws. The Infosoc Directive attempted to harmonize copyright law
across Europe by replacing an estimated “two-thirds of national
45
copyright laws” with pan-Europe legislation. The InfoSoc Directive
also implemented many of the WIPO Internet Treaties’ provisions,
including legal penalties for the circumvention of technological
46
safeguards. Thus, in many respects, the InfoSoc Directive was similar
to the United States’ DMCA.
38. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 28.
39. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, Sept. 9,
1886, as last revised, at Paris July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
40. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 28, at 4-6.
41. Id. at 7.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. RENDA ET AL., supra note 9, at 13.
45. Id. at 6.
46. Directive 2001/29, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on
the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information
Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 6, 1 (EC).
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A. Criticism of the InfoSoc Directive Leads to its Reconsideration
The InfoSoc Directive sought to achieve four goals for European
Copyright law: (1) align European Union legislation with international
copyright law, (2) strengthen intellectual property protections in the
digital era, (3) reduce existing disparities between member-state
national legal systems regarding copyright law, and (4) ensure adequate
47
levels of remuneration and compensation for authors and performers.
Internal European Union reports conducted by the Centre for European
Policy Studies (“CEPS”) determined that the InfoSoc Directive
adequately achieved its first goal by implementing the three-step test for
intellectual property rights exceptions and limitations into European
Union Member State’s laws; broadening the definition of intellectual
property rights, and endorsing anti-circumvention measures as a viable
48
means of enforcing copyright laws against individual actors. However,
CEPS went on to later determine that the InfoSoc Directive only
49
partially achieved, or even failed to achieve its other goals.
Per the CEPS report, the InfoSoc Directive failed to adequately
enforce copyright laws to the extent that European Union legislators
50
envisioned. It relied heavily on prosecuting and enjoining those who
51
circumvent technological protection measures.
However, these
protective measures turned out to be an inferior means of protecting
online content, as circumventors were hard to locate and take to
52
court. As a result, one of the few options available to infringed-upon
copyright holders was to seek an injunction against online
intermediaries for the takedown of infringing content, rather than
53
seeking redress with the infringing content posters themselves.
However, CEPS determined these injunctions were inadequate because
of the many protections content hosts enjoyed due to their status as
47. RENDA ET AL., supra note 9, at 125.
48. Id.; see generally About CEPS, CEPS https://www.ceps.eu/about-ceps/ (last visited
Apr. 12, 2019) (stating CEPS is a private non-profit Brussels-based “think-tank and forum for
debate on European Union affairs” that “offer[s] exchanges, [and] provide[s] insights and
potential solutions for EU policy….” It gets its funding through corporate and institutional
membership fees, project research, foundation grants, conference fees, and publication sales.);
CTR. FOR EUR. POLICY STUD., ANNUAL REPORT 2017–2018 at 27-28 (2018), https://www.ceps.
eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/CEPS_Annual-Report-2017.pdf (detailing sources of funding via
pie chart, including various EU Federal and Member State, corporate, and private funding).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 126.
51. Id. at 125.
52. Id. at 126.
53. Id.
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“mere conduits” under the InfoSoc Directive and other similarly
54
situated European Union Directives. Thus, there were few options for
copyright holders to seek enforcement of their copyrights, rendering the
InfoSoc Directive impotent as a means of protection.
The InfoSoc Directive also faced a major issue in regard to
member state implementation. Because the European Union sought to
strengthen copyright protections and the InfoSoc Directive had to reflect
the WIPO Internet Treaties’ obligations, the Directive’s goal of creating
a homogenous internal market was found incompatible and was forced
55
onto the back burner. Furthermore, member states’ implementation of
varying exceptions and limitations of the WIPO Internet Treaties’ three56
step test led to a wide variety of copyright regimes across the Union.
CEPS’s last criticism was in regard to the InfoSoc Directive’s
inability to ensure adequate levels of remuneration and compensation
57
for a majority of copyright holders. This inability was based on the
Directive’s reliance on vague terms such as “market mechanisms,”
“appropriate rewards,” and “fair compensation” for authors and
performers to determine the fair value of a copyrighted work via a
58
hands-off approach. Ultimately, CEPS’s major issue with the
perceived inadequate remuneration levels was that fair remuneration in
the InfoSoc Directive was not based on a “‘fair’ distribution of revenues
along the value chain for legitimate uses of creative content . . . which
generate the bulk of the revenues,” but rather on “unauthorized but
59
legitimate… uses of an author’s or performer’s creative content.”
CEPS further based its “market forces” criticism of fair
remuneration on the fact that the InfoSoc Directive failed to determine
60
what “fair remuneration” is and how it is determined. CEPS
acknowledged “the uniform interpretation of equitable remuneration
implies that Member States should ensure a proper balance between the
interests of performers and other right-holders, in relation with the
61
economic value of the use under consideration.” However, this
provided little guidance in determining what “fair remuneration”
actually is. This was further complicated by contractual provisions that
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.; see also Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J (L 178) 12-1(EC).
RENDA ET AL., supra note 9, at 126.
Id.
Id. at 108-09.
Id.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 108-09.
Id. at 111.
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Member States allow relevant parties to make in determining the final
62
remuneration amount to authors and performers.
CEPS’s final criticism on the determination of adequate
remuneration to authors and performers under the InfoSoc Directive
was, in part, based off of a perception that such remuneration was based
on a compensation-per-use approach rather than a lump-sum
63
approach. Their report determined this approach disproportionately
benefitted “best-selling” authors, as opposed to less-than-successful
64
authors. Pay-per-use placed more entrepreneurial risk and pertransaction costs on the author/performer, who may not want to or be
65
able to take these on.
Lump sums however shielded an
author/performer from unexpected negative shifts in market
66
consumption patterns.
The CEPS report on the InfoSoc Directive led Members of
European Parliament (“MEPs”) to agree to reconsider Europe’s
67
copyright regime. In 2012, the European Commission announced it
would review the InfoSoc Directive to identify and eliminate its
68
inefficiencies.
B. The Jean-Claude Juncker Presidency and the Rise of the Digital
Single Market
After the election of Jean-Claude Juncker to the European Union
presidency in 2014, the Union attempted to create a Digital Single
69
Market (“DSM”). In one of his first official communications,
President Juncker stated:
A Digital Single Market is one in which the free movement of
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured and where
individuals and businesses can seamlessly access and exercise
online activities under conditions of fair competition, and a
62. Id. at 112.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Dave Keating & Peter O’Donnell, Battle on EU Copyright Law Re-opened by
Commission, POLITICO (May 12, 2012, 11:05 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/battle-on-eucopyright-law-re-opened-by-commission/.
68. Id. at 2.
69. European Commission Memo MEMO/14/523, Questions and Answers: The Juncker
Commission (Sep. 10, 2015) (discussing Pres. Juncker’s creation and implementation of
European Union’s Digital Single Market. Outlines legislators/legislative bodies that will be
involved).
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high level of consumer and personal data protection,
irrespective of their nationality or place of residence.
Achieving a Digital Single Market will ensure that Europe
maintains its position as a world leader in the digital economy,
70
helping European companies to grow globally.
In his call for a European DSM, President Juncker also called for the
weakening of European telecommunications regulations and the
71
reduction of copyright and data protection legislation. He argued that
this would increase Europe’s ability to take advantage of borderless
72
digital technologies.
President Juncker then assigned the Vice-President of the DSM
and others in the cabinet to determine the proper steps to the
73
implementation of a European DSM. Upon finding that a DSM could
increase the European Union’s gross domestic product by up to €415
billion per year, and that the InfoSoc Copyright Directive could be
salvaged and made effective, the European Parliament affirmed support
74
for the creation of the DSM. However, in order to create this DSM
that President Juncker imagined, the flawed 2001 InfoSoc Copyright
Directive would need to be revisited.

70. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Digital Single
Market Strategy for Europe, at 1, COM (2015) 192 final (May 6, 2015), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1447773803386&uri=CELEX:52015DC0192 [hereinafter A Digital
Single Market Strategy for Europe].
71. Id. at 3.
72. Id. at 2.
73. European Commission Memo MEMO/14/523, supra note 69.
74. A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, supra note 70 (communicating the
Commission’s desire to create European Union Digital Single Market. Says it must do so by
breaking down telecommunications regulation and copyright legislation); European Parliament
Resolution of 9 July 2015 on the Implementation of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, EUR. PARL. DOCS. (P8_TA(2015)
0273) (2015) (European Union Parliament vote on resolution to create and implement the
European Union Digital Single Market. References WIPO “internet” treaties as influences in the
creation of this project); see also European Commission Press Release STATEMENT/19/1839,
Copyright Reform: The Commission Welcomes European Parliament’s Vote in Favor of
Modernized Rules Fit for Digital Age (Mar. 26, 2019), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
STATEMENT-19-1839_en.htm [hereinafter Copyright Reform]. (The European Commission
stating that the proposed Copyright Directive for the Digital Single Market will “strengthen
creative industries, which represent . . . 6.8% of [European Union] GDP . . . .” ).
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C. The Birth of the Copyright Directive for the Digital Single Market
The European Parliament renewed their efforts to address the need
for a new comprehensive copyright directive for all of Europe. After
about two years of discussions, the European Parliament decided on
75
language for the DSM Copyright Directive’s first draft. In July 2018,
318 MEPs voted against opening implementation discussions with
European Union member countries, 278 voted in favor, and thirty-one
76
abstained. Many MEPs feared that this directive would lead to
censorship or filtration of the internet and restrictions on freedom of
77
speech.
In September 2018, however, a revised version of the DSM
Copyright Directive gained approval from the European Parliament and
was set to be presented to member states for further discussion and
78
implementation. Although it had much in common with its earlier
June predecessor, it had some key differences. The revised DSM
Copyright Directive specifically called for artists to receive payment
when their works are shared partially or in their entirety on online
79
content hosts. However, this proposed Directive exempted micro-and
80
small-platforms from its mandates. The Directive also included
provisions that Parliament thought would secure freedom of expression
81
for Europeans. The text of this stage of the Directive also called for
82
platforms to check for copyright infringing works upon their upload.
However, it called for this to be conducted in a way that avoided
catching non-infringing works and that implemented adequate redress

75. EUR. PARL. DOCS. (P8_TA (2015) 0273), supra note 74.
76. Mark Sweeny & Jennifer Rankin, YouTube and Facebook Escape Billions in Copyright
Payouts After EU Vote, GUARDIAN (July 5, 2018, 8:44 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2018/jul/05/youtube-could-escape-billions-in-copyright-payouts-after-eu-vote
(discusses how the first version of the revised Copyright Directive was shot down and that a
revised version was likely to come up in Sept. 2018).
77. Id.
78. Vincent, supra note 1 (report on the Sept. 2018 European Union approval of new
Copyright Directive language. Criticizes articles 11 and 13 and states that a vote is likely in Jan.
2019).
79. European Parliament Press Release, Parliament Adopts Its Position on Digital
Copyright Rules (Sep. 12, 2018, 1:27 PM), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/
20180906IPR12103/parliament-adopts-its-position-on-digital-copyright-rules
[hereinafter
Parliament Adopts Its Position].
80. Micro- and small-platforms are content hosts that are small in size, number of visitors,
and services provided; Id.
81. E.g. Id. (sharing hyperlinks to news articles along with “individual words” would not
be considered copyright infringement).
82. Id.
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systems. Checking mechanisms, or content filtration systems, were
required to be operated by human staff and could not be handled by an
84
algorithm. It also gave artists the ability to claim additional
compensation from platforms that see a great benefit from an artist’s
work when the artist is receiving disproportionately low benefits from
85
its use. This included claims to the platform’s indirect profits that
result from the use of the artist’s work under threat of the artist revoking
86
their license to the platform.
The European Parliament’s September 2018 vote approved the
updated language for the DSM Copyright Directive and prepared it for
tripartite negotiations between the European Commission, Counsel of
87
the European Union, and the European Parliament. A conclusion to
these ‘trilogue’ negotiations was initially expected in early 2019,
88
whereupon language within the legislation would be up for agreement.
If the language had been approved then, the European Parliament would
have proceeded to vote on whether to implement the Directive and the
European Union’s individual Member States would have then been
89
required to implement the Directive into their own national laws.
However, on January 18, 2019, the Council of the European Union
rejected a mandate to continue negotiations on the language of the
90
proposed DSM Copyright Directive with the European Parliament.
The Romanian-headed Council Presidency’s proposed language for the
Directive was rejected by Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland,
Slovenia, Italy, Poland, Sweden, Croatia, Luxembourg, and Portugal
91
due to concerns about Articles 11 and 13.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Vincent, supra note 1 (report on the Sept. 2018 European Union approval of new
Copyright Directive language. Criticizes articles 11 and 13 and states that a vote is likely in Jan.
2019).
88. Julia Reda, Copyright Negotiations Hit a Brick Wall in Council, JULIAREDA.EU (Jan.
18, 2019), https://juliareda.eu/2019/01/copyright-hits_wall/ (discussing stalled trilogue talks on
Jan. 21, 2019 due to governing bodies’ disagreements on Directive language).
89. Vincent, supra note 1.
90. See generally Description of the Council of the European Union, EUR. UNION, https://
europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/council-eu_en (last visited Aug. 2019)
(discussing the role of the Council of the European Union, including its composition of executive
branch government ministers from member states who discuss, amend, and adopt laws, and
coordinate policies. Together with the European Parliament, it is the main decision-making body
of the Union that negotiates laws proposed by the European Commission).
91. Reda, supra note 88 (German MEP discusses Council’s rejection of the language of the
Copyright Directive proposed by the Romanian Presidency).
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The Romanian Presidency of the Council of the European Union
then had the opportunity to come up with language for the proposed
DSM Copyright Directive that adhered to the language approved in the
September 2018 vote and that would still be passed by a qualified
92
majority of the Council. A “qualified majority” is fifty-five percent of
the Council that represents at least sixty-five percent of the European
93
Union population. This was however further complicated by the
94
upcoming elections for European Parliament in May of 2019. If an
agreement on the proposed DSM Copyright Directive’s language could
not be reached by then, it would have been up to the next legislative
session to decide on the language, and even the viability, of the
95
proposed Directive. However, due to the Directive’s long history of
support within European Union governance and its well-funded
proponents, a new legislative session of the European Parliament would
have likely taken up the issue again.
However, this contingency did not come to fruition because as of
February 13, 2019, the Romanian delegation for the Presidency of the
European Council has reached a provisional agreement with the
European Parliament on the language of the proposed Copyright
96
Directive. This language still contains most of the same controversial
language that caused concern with Articles 11 and 13, however it did
update language regarding exceptions and limitations, licensing
97
practices, and copyright marketplace regulations. Even though the
Romanian Presidency of the European Council and the European
Parliament have provisionally agreed to this new language, it must now
be submitted to the member states that comprise the Council and to the
98
European Parliament for their confirmation. Upon approval of the
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Foo Yun Chee, In Win for Tech Giants, EU Copyright Reforms Stalled, REUTERS (Jan.
21, 2019, 5:19 AM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-copyright/in-win-for-tech-giants-eucopyright-reforms-stalled-idUKKCN1PF1AO (discussing results of the Council of the European
Union’s vote on the Copyright Directive in 2019).
95. Matt Reynolds, What is Article 13? The EU’s Divisive New Copyright Plan Explained,
WIRED (May 24, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-article-13-article-11-europeandirective-on-copyright-explained-meme-ban.
96. Council of the European Union Press Release, EU Copyright Rules Adjusted to the
Digital Age (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/02/
13/eu-copyright-rules-adjusted-to-the-digital-age/ [hereinafter EU Copyright Rules Adjusted].
97. Council Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Copyright in the Digital Single Market, COD (2016) 6637/19 (Feb. 20, 2019), https://data.
consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6637-2019-INIT/en/pdf.
98. EU Copyright Rules Adjusted, supra note 96.
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provisional language, the directive will again be submitted to both
institutions for approval. A vote on this language was expected to take
99
place in March or April of 2019.
In spite of protests directed at Article 13 and the DSM Copyright
Directive, generally, from many European Union citizens and online
100
101
platforms and petitions against the passing of the Directive, on
March 26, 2019, the European Parliament approved a revised version of
the DSM Copyright Directive by a vote of 348 in favor to 274 against,
102
with thirty-six abstentions. As of this writing, the European Union
member states will now have a chance to vote on approval of the DSM
103
Copyright Directive text. If the text is accepted, member states will
104
have two years to implement it into their national systems. Of the
changes included in this revised version, the most notable is one of
nomenclature. The often-vilified Article 13 has now been renamed to
105
Article 17.
These revised articles call for the exclusion of this
Directive’s applicability to graphics interchange format files (“GIFs”),
memes, and news article snippets and place lighter obligations on micro
106
and small-content platforms. However, just because these contentious
areas now seem to enjoy exemptions on the Directive’s face, it does not
mean its operation will actually spare content platforms from
infringement worries.
II. HOW DOES NET NEUTRALITY RELATE TO EUROPE’S COPYRIGHT
DIRECTIVE REVISION?
As initially discussed above, net neutrality names the principle that
calls for internet service providers to enable access to all content and
99. Timothy B. Lee, European Governments Approve Controversial New Copyright Law,
ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 21, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/02/europeangovernments-approve-controversial-new-copyright-law/.
100. Reaction as MEPs Back Controversial Online Copyright Reforms, EURONEWS (Mar.
26, 2019), https://www.euronews.com/2019/03/26/meps-back-online-copyright-reforms-thatcritics-fear-will-curtail-freedom-of-information; Morgan Meaker, Inside the Giant German
Protest Trying to Bring Down Article 13, WIRED (Mar. 26, 2019); https://www.wired.co.uk/
article/article-13-protests.
101. Id.
102. European Parliament Press Release, 20190321IPR32110, European Parliament
Approves New Copyright Rules for the Internet (March 26, 2019), http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/pdfs/news/expert/2019/3/press_release/20190321IPR32110/20190321IPR32110_en.pdf.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in
the Digital Single Market, supra note 2.
106. Parliament Adopts its Position, supra note 79.
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applications, regardless of the source and without favoring or blocking
107
particular products or websites.
Without net neutrality, internet
service providers could intentionally block, slow down, or charge access
to specific content and websites. Internet service providers have an
incentive to violate net neutrality principles for a variety of reasons. The
DSM Copyright Directive calls for provisions that would violate net
neutrality principles. To help clarify these violations, it is important to
consider both corporate and governmental net neutrality violation
examples and hypotheticals to get an idea of how this proposed
directive might actually play out.
A. Hypotheticals and Examples of Corporate Net Neutrality Violations
In our first hypothetical, suppose that Comcast created original
programming that competes with Netflix. In order to get Comcast
consumers to stop using Netflix, Comcast could ‘throttle’ the streaming
service—or intentionally slow down the flow of data from Netflix
servers to the end consumer—with the goal of getting these consumers
to choose Comcast’s comparatively faster streaming service instead.
This throttling would lead to consumers not receiving what they
specifically sought out and settling for a comparative service while
internet service providers see undue revenue. In this hypothetical, the
network owner unfairly tipped the balance on the scales of competition
in their favor to the consumer’s detriment.
Another worrisome hypothetical of a relevant net neutrality
violation is when ISPs control a consumer’s ability to communicate
with the digital world to the providers’ benefit. For example, suppose a
consumer wishes to order new shoes from Amazon. AT&T could block
this consumer’s access to Amazon by various means, thereby blocking
the consumer from making their intended purchase and stopping
Amazon from making a sale. Additionally, in this hypothetical, suppose
AT&T is also paid by Target to redirect consumers to the Target
website whenever this consumer wishes to shop on Amazon. AT&T
could then direct the consumer away from their desired online store,
which may result in a purchase the consumer did not intend to make
from a company they did not intend to buy from. This also denies
Amazon the money from the sale they should have been able to make.
These may seem like incredible hypotheticals of net neutrality
violations, and indeed these two are intended to be extreme. Regardless,
107.

GILROY, supra note 12, at 1.
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there have been net neutrality violations by companies in the past.
While not as egregious as the above violations, they are close enough
that they should cause consumers to pause and consider what might
happen next time a company decides to violate net neutrality.
In one real-world net neutrality violation example from 2009,
Apple was required to remove all Skype apps from its app store by its
108
then exclusive U.S. carrier AT&T.
The telecommunications giant
was threatened by competition from the free voice-over-internetprotocol app, as it provided a widely popular and free or lower-cost
109
alternative to AT&T’s cellular services. Apple was forced to block
Skype calls over AT&T’s cellular networks in a violation of net
neutrality after consumers showed they desired Skype’s services by
110
making the app number one on the App Store best-seller list.
Consumers were unable to reap the benefits of healthy competition
because another company filtered specific data from reaching
consumers who desired its consumption.
Another real-world example of the precarious nature of net
neutrality came in 2011. Cell phone service provider MetroPCS sued
the FCC to overturn recently implemented net neutrality regulations
because it desired to block all audio and video streams on its customer’s
111
phones except for YouTube data streams. This violated net neutrality
rules because it locked MetroPCS customers out of other streaming
platforms by ‘zero rating’ YouTube. This forced MetroPCS customers
to support YouTube with no choice in the matter. T-Mobile eventually
112
purchased MetroPCS and dropped the lawsuit in 2013.
B. Hypotheticals and Examples of Governmental Net Neutrality
Violations
An extreme hypothetical net neutrality violation can come into
effect when governments or political parties get involved. To illustrate,
imagine a world where the European Union does not want its citizens or
residents to discuss, foment, or learn anything about communism or
108. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Group Asks FCC to Probe iPhone Skype Restrictions, FORTUNE
(Apr. 3, 2009), http://fortune.com/2009/04/03/group-asks-fcc-to-probe-iphone-skype-restrictions/.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Ryan Singel, Accused of Violating Net Neutrality, MetroPCS Sues FCC, WIRED (Jan.
25, 2011), https://www.wired.com/2011/01/metropcs-net-neutrality-challenge/.
112. Adi Robertson, T-Mobile Drops Anti-Net Neutrality Lawsuit Filed by MetroPCS,
Leaving Verizon on Its Own, VERGE (May 17, 2013), https://www.theverge.com/2013/5/17/
4341280/tmobile-drops-metropcs-anti-net-neutrality-lawsuit.
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fascism. The European Union could make a deal with European internet
service providers to monitor every communication a European citizen
makes, report these communications, ensure the communications do not
go through, and block any search results the European Parliament
deems not worthy of showing. However laudable a lawmaker’s
intentions may or may not be in this hypothetical, this would constitute
a violation of net neutrality that would only hurt constituents,
democratic principles and institutions, and actual free-market
innovations; violating the right to a fair trial, freedom of expression, and
113
privacy under the European Convention on Human Rights.
In 2018, governments from Egypt and Iran engaged in anti-net114
neutral practices that also violated human rights. These governments
“rewrote restrictive media laws to apply to social media users, jailed
critics under measures designed to curb false news, and blocked foreign
115
social media and communication services.” These laws violate net
neutrality by either prohibiting their citizens from accessing the
‘undesirable’ content, or by targeting those users who might
disseminate such ‘undesirable’ content online.
C. Europe’s History with Net Neutrality
As it currently stands, the European Union claims to support net
neutrality, but that is not the entire truth of the matter. The European
Parliament passed a regulation entitled “laying down measures
concerning open internet access and amending Directive 2002/22/EC on
universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications
networks and services and Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 on roaming on
public mobile communications networks within the Union” that set the
116
rules on open internet access. The regulation states that it:
[A]ims to establish common rules to safeguard equal and nondiscriminatory treatment of traffic in the provision of internet
113. See Felipe Romero-Moreno, ‘Notice and staydown’ and social media: amending
Article 13 of the Proposed Directive on Copyright, 33 INT’L REV. L., COMPUTERS & TECH. 187,
1, 14, 17 (2018) (discussing the proposed Directive on Copyright’s Article 13 and its violation of
social media platforms’ and their users’ right to a fair trial and freedoms to privacy and
expression under Articles 6, 8, and 10, respectively, of the European Convention on Human
Rights); see generally Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms arts. 6, 8, 10, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
114. Adrian Shahbaz, The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2018
(Freedom House, Wash. D.C.), Oct. 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_
2018_Final%20Booklet_11_1_2018.pdf.
115. Id.
116. Council Regulation 2015/2120, 2015 O.J. (L310) 1 (EU).
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access services and related end-users’ rights. It aims to protect
end-users and simultaneously to guarantee the continued
functioning of the internet ecosystem as an engine of
117
innovation.
However, this regulation codifies exceptions that allow internet service
providers to engage in non-net-neutral practices, such as allowing
member states to determine the viability of commercially-driven zerorating practices, allowing internet service provider-determined “traffic
management measures,” and permitting internet service providers to
118
group traffic into classes. These loopholes have even been brought to
the attention of European lawmakers who continuously vote to leave
119
them open.
In comparison, the United States once had laws in support of net
neutrality under the Obama and Bush administrations. However, under
the Trump Administration’s Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”) headed by Commissioner Ajit Pai, this principle has been all
but eradicated. In December 2017, the FCC voted to dismantle these
regulations, essentially reversing an FCC decision in 2015 for stronger
net neutrality regulations. Commissioner Pai argued that repealing the
regulations would allow for internet service providers to offer packages
120
at competitive prices for price-conscious consumers.
Accordingly,
this stance exemplifies an extreme approach to anti-net-neutrality
measures that Europe has not yet achieved. However, the European
Union is continuing down its own path to a non-net-neutral regime by
approving this proposed directive that requires strict algorithmic content
filtration systems under the guise of increased copyright protections.
Even though the United States has taken an anti-net-neutrality
approach to internet regulations at the Federal level, state-level action
may preserve these consumer-friendly regulations. For example,
California has enacted regulations for internet service providers who
121
wish to do business in the state.
Specifically, in 2018 California
117.
118.

Id.
Alex Hern, EU net neutrality laws fatally undermined by loopholes, critics say,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2015, 09:30), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/oct/27/eu-netneutrality-laws-fatally-undermined-by-loopholes-critics-say (discusses the problems with and
limitations to the European Union’s net neutrality laws).
119. Id.
120. Cecilia Kang, F.C.C. Repeals Net Neutrality Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/technology/net-neutrality-repeal-vote.html.
121. S.B. 822, 2017-18 Reg. Sess., (Cal. 2018) (demonstrating language of recently-passed
California net-neutrality bill which shows Californians have adopted laws similar to old FCC netneutrality rules (pre-Trump era).
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passed Senate Bill 822, which has many of the same net-neutrality
122
regulations the FCC had in place in 2015.
The European Union’s Federated system requires member states to
enact a directive after the European Parliament and the European
123
Commission have agreed on the directive’s language. As such, there
is no chance for member states to ‘pull a California’ and reject this
proposed Copyright directive. Thus, Europe is likely to follow the
United States’ lead and become less net neutral.
D. The Copyright Directive for the Digital Single Market is not Net
Neutral
Keeping in mind concerns of net neutrality violations by
corporations and governments that could result in violations of freedom
124
of privacy, freedom of expression, and a right to a fair trial, we now
turn to how the net neutrality concept applies to the European Union’s
DSM Copyright Directive. The European Union’s government is calling
on internet service providers and content hosts to invade consumers’
private online activities, become monitors of artistic expressions, and
filter user posts with algorithmic assistance. The proposed copyright
directive would require large technology firms to violate net neutrality
by monitoring uploads and communications between their users and
blocking, or otherwise filtering, any attempts to upload copyrighted
materials if they want to conduct business in Europe.
Upon first impression, this may seem like a laudable goal because
artists and authors should receive protection and due compensation for
their work online, as they would through almost any other medium.
However, there are plenty of uses of copyrighted materials that do not
violate copyright laws but are difficult to legislate and implement
exceptions around. These uses come in many forms, including but not
limited to copying for private use, educational use, parodic or satirical
use, and other fair uses. This could lead to the stifling of creative output
to the detriment of European society, as the algorithmic filters that these
gate-keepers would inevitably have to turn to are not sophisticated
enough to make these fair-use determinations. Even human filters
would not easily be able to make such determinations, as these are
difficult legal questions that usually require time to litigate before a
122. Id.
123. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
288, signed Mar. 25, 1957 O.J. (C 326) [hereinafter TFEU].
124. See Felipe Romero-Moreno, supra note 113.
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determination can be made. The old adage applies: “all great artists
borrow from those who came before them.”
III. EXAMINING ARTICLE 13 THROUGH A NET NEUTRALITY LENS
Net neutrality provides an important focal point through which
current and proposed copyright laws throughout the world should be
examined. However, the purpose of this note is not to critique the
institution of copyright laws in general. Current copyright regimes
certainly have their merits and place within society, and their
examination is reserved for a different discussion. Instead, net neutrality
is used here to critically examine the European Union’s recommended
expansion of copyright laws in the DSM Copyright Directive.
Here, the expansion suggested by the DSM Copyright Directive is
scrutinized. Specifically, the proposed expansion of rights against and
new legal burdens upon ISPs and online content hosts under Article 13
are criticized under a net neutrality lens. As of May 25, 2018, the
Council of the European Union identified “closing the value gap” as a
main reason for including Article 13 in the newly proposed Copyright
125
Directive. They define the value gap as the difference “between the
remuneration received by authors and performers and the profits made
126
by internet platforms when they make their works accessible.” In an
attempt to close this value gap, Article 13 eliminates important
exemptions to copyright law. It is possible for economies and countries
to benefit from net neutrality principles and status-quo copyright
regimes, but anti-net-neutral copyright laws like those in the proposed
Copyright Directive can be detrimental and should not be adopted.
A. Elimination of Safe-Harbor Protections
One of Article 13’s biggest changes proposes the elimination of
hosting exemptions, also known as ‘safeguard’ exemptions, for
127
copyright infringement of for-profit online content-hosting providers.
125. Council of the European Union Press Release, Copyright Rules for the Digital
Environment: Council Agrees its Position (May 25, 2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/press/press-releases/2018/05/25/copyright-rules-for-the-digital-environment-council-agreesits-position/ [hereinafter Copyright Rules for the Digital Environment].
126. Id.
127. Copyright Reform, supra note 74.; see also Council Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, EUR. PARL.
DOC. (COD 6637/19) (2016), https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6637-2019INIT/en/pdf; Interinstitutional Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market, COD (2016) 0280 (May 25, 2018) (discusses
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Article 13 revives those exemptions for continued protection if online
content sharing service providers take effective measures to prevent the
availability of unlicensed and claimed copyrighted works, act quickly to
remove them, and they show they have implemented effective steps to
128
ensure infringement will not happen again. This mechanism creates
an incentive for these online content hosts and ISPs to stop and prevent
users from uploading materials that infringe on others’ copyrights
altogether through the use of automated content filters. These filters are
known to flag and take down legally permitted uses of copyrighted
material, including fair use and licensed use, to the principle of net
neutrality’s detriment.
Article 13’s safe-harbor elimination provision exacerbates the
potential for net neutrality violations. The Council of the European
Union admittedly targets “online service providers whose main purpose
(or one of whose main purposes) is to provide access to a large amount
of copyright-protected content uploaded by their users for the purpose
129
of making profits from organizing and promoting it.”
This safeharbor elimination creates an unclear goal that will be difficult for
network owners to achieve. Determining what a platform’s “main
purpose” is, what a “large amount of copyright protected content” is,
and what “making profits from organizing and promoting” copyrightprotected is will be exceedingly difficult and will require further
definition from European Union governing bodies. Article 13 creates
many ambiguities with little means to decipher them.
B. Content Filter Requirement
While “filling the value gap” and “improving cooperation between
rights holders and online platforms” seem like laudable goals on their
face, further examination of Article 13 reveals some issues with these
130
goals that should cause concern.
False or wrongful claims of
copyright infringement are already a source of controversy on online
content hosting providers’ platforms thanks to content filters and
copyright claim trolls. The DMS Copyright Directive would only
exacerbate this problem. For example, it is not unusual for videos of
approved
now take
17).
128.
129.
130.

language for Article 13. States that the tripartite negotiations on implementation can
place. This same Article can be found in the latest version of the directive as Article
Id.
Copyright Rules for the Digital Environment, supra note 125.
Id.
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classical music covers (for which the sheet music has been in the public
domain for hundreds of years) that are posted to Facebook to be claimed
as a copyright infringement and subsequently taken down automatically
131
without input from the poster. This is also a rampant problem on
YouTube and similar content hosts, which has had negative subsequent
132
effects on all kinds of original creative content.
Despite claims from the Council of the European Union that
member-state implementation of the proposed Copyright Directive
would not and cannot create or compound the current problems
associated with automated content filters, companies that currently deal
with such filters and who would be responsible for implementing them
not only disagree, but wonder how this Directive could function without
133
such automated filters. Content filters violate net neutrality because
both algorithm and human-based filters stop users from receiving the
flow of data they desire, including for lawful uses. History shows this
failure of content filters almost always results in net neutrality
violations.
C. Historical Inadequacies of Content Filters
In 2015, YouTube’s automated content filter flagged and
134
demonetized an original twelve-second video of a cat purring.
YouTube claimed that its filters identified the purring as the musical
composition “FOCUS” whose rights are owned and controlled by EMI
135
Music Publishing and PRS.
MEP Julia Reda says that this

131. Cory Doctorow, The Future is Here Today: You Can’t Play Bach on Facebook
Because Sony Says They Own His Compositions, BOING BOING (Sept. 5, 2018), https://
boingboing.net/2018/09/05/mozart-bach-sorta-mach.html.
132. See Tom Gerken, YouTube’s Copyright Claim System Abused by Extorters, BBC
NEWS (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-47227937 [hereinafter Gerken,
YouTube’s Copyright Claim]; Ulrich Kaiser, Can Beethoven send Takedown Requests? A FirstHand Account of One German Professor’s Experience with Overly Broad Upload Filters,
WIKIMEDIA FOUND. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://wikimediafoundation.org/2018/08/27/can-beethoven
-send-takedown-requests-a-first-hand-account-of-one-german-professors-experience-with-overlybroad-upload-filters/; Cory Doctorow, Music Professor Shows How the EU’s Looming
Extinction-Level Internet Policy Will Work (Fail), BOING BOING, (Sept. 4, 2018), https://
boingboing.net/2018/09/04/ludivico-technique.html.
133. Chee, supra note 94 (discussing the requirement to install upload filters); Reynolds,
supra note 95 (discussing the implementation of automated content filters and the amended
version of the Copyright Directive that disavowed the use of automated filters).
134. Ernesto Van Der Sar, YouTube Flags Cat Purring as Copyright Infringing Music,
TORRENTFREAK (Feb. 11, 2015) https://torrentfreak.com/youtube-flags-cat-purring-as-copyrightinfringing-music-150211/.
135. Id.
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“ridiculous” error, made after years of investing in filters, shows
that ”[i]t’s extremely hard to get this technology right—if it is possible
136
at all.” This example shows that content filters are highly likely to
erroneously prohibit internet users from legitimately accessing the
content they desire. This clear net neutrality violation example is not in
isolation.
Another content filter failure is their inability to identify lawful
uses of copyrighted materials, such as for educational purposes. In
2016, Harvard Law Professor William Fisher’s video lesson on
copyright law was ironically flagged and taken down by YouTube’s
automated filters because it contained clips of songs from Jimi Hendrix,
137
Joe Cocker, and other artists. In another similar example, YouTube
flagged NASA’s video footage of the Mars rover Curiosity’s landing for
copyright infringement even though NASA was the video’s creator and,
per U.S. government policy, the footage belongs in the public
138
domain. Julia Reda claims that these takedowns show “[f]ilters can’t
determine whether a use is covered by an exception. . . .” and that
139
“[p]ublic domain content is at risk. . . .” These examples show net
neutrality violations because internet users were denied access to
lawfully consume the material they desired via exceptions to copyright
laws that content filters are unable to compute. If this well-funded
content filtration system cannot account for lawful uses of copyrighted
materials, then users should not expect their rights to access these
materials to be preserved.
Filters have also been utilized by national governments across the
world in violation of not only net neutrality principles, but of human
rights ones, as well. The People’s Republic of China’s sweeping 2018
Cybersecurity Law “. . . require[ed] that local and foreign companies
work to ‘immediately stop transmission’ of banned content, and
compel[ed] them to ensure that all data about Chinese users is hosted
140
within the country.”
Additionally, China’s ‘Great Firewall’ has

136. Julia Reda, When Filters Fail, (Sept. 28, 2017), https://juliareda.eu/2017/09/whenfilters-fail/.
137. Ernesto Van der Sar, YouTube Copyright Complaint Kills Harvard Professor’s
Copyright Lecture, TORRENTFREAK (Feb. 17, 2016), https://torrentfreak.com/youtube-copyrightcomplaint-kills-harvard-professors-copyright-lecture-160217/.
138. Mike Masnick, How Google’s ContentID System Fails at Fair Use, TECHDIRT (Aug. 8,
2012, 2:55 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120808/12301619967/how-googlescontentid-system-fails-fair-use-public-domain.shtml.
139. Reda, supra note 136.
140. Shahbaz, supra note 114, at 6.

FINAL_FOR_JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

Net Neutrality and the EU’s Copyright Directive

10/7/2020 6:49 AM

89

stopped their citizens from accessing non-government approved
141
websites and apps that they may have otherwise desired to use. These
measures implemented by the Chinese government are anti-net-neutral
because they utilize content filtration systems to explicitly prohibit their
citizens from consuming the content they desire and re-route them to
142
government-approved equivalents.
Since content cannot be reasonably and correctly filtered with the
use of automated algorithmic filters, an alternative and more accurate
‘filter’ could be human beings. This approach seems to be what the
European Union is envisioning. However, this is unrealistic because the
sheer data volume uploaded to content hosts makes it near impossible
143
for humans to keep up. Even if a human could process this immense
amount of data, it would be impossible for them to give adequate and
equal consideration to fair use, exempted non-infringing use, licensed
use, and other justifications for the uploading of copyrighted material
while still being able to address every piece of content in a timely
manner.
Creative works build off of ideas and other works created before it
and, indeed, human ingenuity and advancements build upon the works
that came before the latest development. In music, many songs rely on
the use of chord progressions that have been around for hundreds of
years. Many songs also sample other copyrighted works that are
transformed when incorporated into a new work. In motion pictures and
books, common themes and characters are constantly reused in plots.
Without the work of countless computer scientists like Alan Turing, we
would likely not have the modern computing systems we have today,
and without the work of internet pioneers like Tim Berners Lee, we
would likely not have the world wide web and even be discussing

141. Id.
142. Id. at 7.
143. See generally Bree Brouwer, YouTube Now Gets Over 400 Hours Of Content
Uploaded Every Minute, TUBEFILTER (Jul. 26, 2015), https://www.tubefilter.com/2015/07/26/
youtube-400-hours-content-every-minute/ (Reporting that 400 hours of video per minute were
uploaded to YouTube in 2015); Melody Hahm, Facebook’s 3,000 New Human Content Monitors
Won’t Prevent Violent Content, YAHOO! FINANCE (May 3, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/
news/facebooks-3000-new-human-content-monitors-wont-prevent-violent-content155248258.html (quoting Mark Zuckerberg, who said 3,000 human content monitors cannot
catch every instance of wrongfully uploaded material and that artificial-intelligence-powered
filters are the only viable option); CNN Business, Will memes be illegal? EU’s copyright
overhaul explained, CNN (Mar. 29, 2019), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/26/tech/eu-copyrightarticle-13/index.html (video explaining that 500 hours of video is uploaded to YouTube every
minute).
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regulation implementation. All of these examples show that access to
and use of prior creative works are essential for the conception of new
creative works. Indeed, many intellectual property regimes around the
world provide legal exceptions for this sort of access. For a country or
federation thereof to enact a law that uses content filters and network
owner liability to stop or severely restrict the lawful transfer of data
goes beyond the mere promise of exclusivity that is characteristic of
intellectual property regimes and violates the important promises of net
neutrality.
IV. WHO WINS UNDER THE COPYRIGHT DIRECTIVE FOR THE DIGITAL
SINGLE MARKET, WHO LOSES AND WHY DOES THIS MATTER?
Under the European Union’s proposed DSM Copyright Directive,
there will certainly be winners and losers in the contemporary internet
law, copyright law, and antitrust law landscape. The DSM Copyright
Directive will expand protections granted under member state copyright
regimes. Subsequently, different groups of people will be affected
differently. It is important to identify who these winners and losers are
because it will shed light on why these groups may or may not value net
neutrality principles and in turn whether society should support them.
By showing who will benefit, it will help us place a value judgment on
whether this proposed Copyright Directive is worthy of support.
A. Winners Under Article 13
Right off the bat, it seems as though copyright holders will
generally see extended benefits under the DSM Copyright Directive’s
Article 13. Under this proposed article, copyright holders are
empowered to negotiate licenses with online content hosts directly, as
these service providers must seek authorization for the use of their
144
copyrights under threat of liability for copyright infringement. The
expansion of these copyright holders’ ability to bring suit for copyright
infringement is something they would all expectedly applaud. However,
further examination shows that not all copyright holders will benefit
equally.

144. European Parliament legislative resolution of 26 March 2019 on the proposal for a
directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single
Market, EUR. PARL. DOC. P8_TA-PROV(2019)0231 122.
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1. Famous Artists and their Media Publishers
Artists with large followings and their media publishers will
disproportionately benefit from the proposed Copyright Directive.
Considering their positions, their support for Article 13 is seemingly for
good reason. Article 13 will allow famous copyright holders to directly
negotiate with content hosts for greater rates of remuneration, especially
if the content does better on the content host’s platform. If successful,
this will take away from the available pool of remunerative funds that
145
would otherwise be available for less-famous and little-known artists.
Famous creatives, including musical artists such as Paul McCartney,
Placido Domingo, and Adele, along with European film leaders like
Mike Leigh, Paolo Sorrentino, Margarethe von Trotta, and Agnieszka
146
Holland all back this proposal. Additionally, organizations including
the Federation of Screenwriters in Europe, the Society of Audiovisual
Authors, the Independent Music Companies Association (“IMPALA”),
and the France-based Confédération Internationale des Sociétés
d’Auteurs et Compositeurs (“CISAC”) also back this proposed
147
directive.
What media publishers and large artists fail to realize, however, is
that laws affecting net neutrality affect their bottom lines, too. Under
Article 13’s regime, consumers may be blocked from famous copyrights
they wished to consume and redirected towards other famous copyrights
or lesser-known copyrighted content alternatives, both of which the
consumer did not originally seek out. This means that many media
publishers’ and large artists’ famous copyrighted content will not be
lawfully consumed by as many consumers as expected. In the end, this
will lead to decreased overall remuneration and diminished negotiating
power for higher licensing fees from content platforms to which these
media publishers and large artists have become accustomed.
Article 13’s implicit requirement for and overreliance upon content
filters, whether code-driven or operated by humans, will make winners
out of companies with deep-enough coffers to pay for filter code
145. Id.
146. Scott Roxborough, What New EU Copyright Law Will Mean for Media, Tech
Companies and Users, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Sept. 17, 2018, 9:29 AM), https://www.
hollywoodreporter.com/news/eu-copyright-directive-analysis-media-tech-internet-users-1144003;
Nick Vivarelli, European Parliament Passes Copyright Directive Giving Artists Greater Share of
Revenue, VARIETY (Sept. 12, 2018, 4:05 AM), https://www.msn.com/en-us/music/news/european
-parliament-passes-copyright-directive-giving-artists-greater-share-of-revenue/ar-BBNdYiO
(discusses who the new Copyright Directive will likely affect positively and negatively).
147. Id.
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development or for the enormous human workforce behind a filtration
system to metaphorically hold copyrighted material for ransom.
Invariably, it will be large technology firms that have the technological
know-how or the availability of funds required for the development of
148
content filtration systems.
Those companies that have already
developed such filters are now ahead of the game and stand to make a
hefty profit from selling their content filters to online content hosting
platforms who would rather purchase a final product rather than spend
149
exorbitant amounts of time and money developing their own. These
firms will then be able to dictate when copyrighted material may show
up in search results, if it is to show up at all. They will also be able to
dictate what other alternative content consumers should be redirected to,
if any at all. If an alternative result is selected by a consumer, the holder
of the original copyright has lost out on any possible remuneration.
Ironically, companies like Alphabet and Facebook may actually see
some benefit to the DSM Copyright Directive’s implementation, albeit
150
one that the European Union Parliament did not intend.
B. Losers Under Article 13
1. Content Hosts
Online content hosting platforms will have the most to lose from
implementation of Article 13’s provisions, as the proposed directive
seems to be deliberately targeting this group. Platforms such as
YouTube, Wikimedia, Twitch, GitHub, Automattic, Qwant, Patreon,
UpCloud, Reddit, Bandcamp, Kickstarter, and more have come out
151
against this directive. The opposition is unsurprising, given the legal
148. WIRED UK, What is Article 13 and will it Kill Memes?, WIRED Explains, YOUTUBE
(Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=502&v=MAqJBDh6GY4.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Save Your Internet, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/saveyourinternet/?noapp=1
(last visited Aug. 29, 2019); Julia Alexander, YouTube CEO calls EU’s proposed copyright
regulation financially impossible, VERGE (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/11/
12/18087250/youtube-ceo-copyright-directive-article-13-european-union.; Susan Wojcicki, A
Final Update of Our Priorities for 2018, YOUTUBE CREATOR BLOG, (Oct. 22, 2018), https://
youtube-creators.googleblog.com/2018/10/a-final-update-on-our-priorities-for.html;
Eileen
Hershenov, How the EU copyright proposal will hurt the web and Wikipedia, WIKIMEDIA
FOUND. (June 29, 2018), https://blog.wikimedia.org/2018/06/29/eu-copyright-proposal-will-hurtweb-wikipedia/; Emmett Shear, A letter from our CEO about Article 13, TWITCH (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://blog.twitch.tv/from-our-ceo-a-letter-to-twitch-creators-about-article-13-16ae8ec41c70;
Abby Volmer, EU wants to require platforms to filter uploaded content (including code),
GITHUB (Mar. 14, 2018), https://github.blog/2018-03-14-eu-proposal-upload-filters-code/; Paul
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ramifications and upending business effects that Article 13 would
impose on these internet companies.
The main points of contention these and many other online content
hosting platforms have with Article 13 is the curb on legitimate free
152
speech (despite the Directive’s claim to protect it). The limitation on
free speech could be caused by the elimination of safe harbor provisions
153
and the content filter requirements. This would force these businesses
to either scrap their current business models and create new means of
operation that comply with the new law while staying faithful to the
service for which they have become relied upon for, or to buy expensive
content filters from the few companies that make them. Both of these
options are too expensive and time consuming for many of these
platforms to reasonably implement.
It is also unclear to many of these online content hosting platforms
how exactly they should police their sites for infringing materials. A
human force is clearly inadequate, yet algorithm-based content filters
154
are prohibited by the DSM Copyright Directive. Content filters seem
to be implicitly required, but they are also too imprecise to determine
when fair use principles should apply, as discussed above.
Additionally, the DSM Directive inadequately addresses the issues
that would affect small to mid-sized online content hosting platforms.
Article 17(6) does call for an exception to liability for online content
hosting platforms that are younger than three years, make less than ten
million Euros per year, and do not exceed five million unique monthly
155
visitors. However, this exception is so limited that it would hardly
apply to any online content hosting platforms. The smaller platforms
that would meet this exception’s requirements, such as Patreon and
DeviantArt, would still eventually be forced to implement expensive
content filters or face copyright infringement claims if and when they
grow out of this exception.
Sieminski, We’re Against Bots, Filtering, and the EU’s New Copyright Directive., WORDPRESS:
TRANSPARENCY BLOG (Jun. 12, 2018), https://transparency.automattic.com/2018/06/12/wereagainst-bots-filtering-and-the-eus-new-copyright-directive/; Guillaume Champeau, Protecting
copyright with robots: a risk for fundamental rights and freedoms, QWANT (Jun. 19, 2018),
https://blog.qwant.com/protecting-copyright-with-robots-a-risk-for-fundamental-rights-andfreedoms/; Weston Dombroski, Patreon Stands With Our EU Creators! #DeleteArt13
#SaveYourInternet, PATREON (Jun. 11, 2018), https://patreonhq.com/patreon-stands-with-our-eucreators-deleteart13-saveyourinternet-903978e94673.
152. EUR. PARL. DOC. P8_TA-PROV(2019)0231, supra note 144, at 126.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 127.
155. EUR. PARL. DOC. P8_TA-PROV(2019)0231, supra note 144, at 125.
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Combining the premise of free speech and the encouragement of
innovation and creativity that many large and small content hosts alike
are built on with the cost and liability-inducing proposals in Article 13
creates a Catch-22 for these platforms. It is unclear how they can be
expected to carry on with their business models, or make reasonable and
affordable changes to them, while still complying with the law. This is
especially troublesome when these online content hosting platforms
regularly deal with falsified copyright infringement claims because
costs and liabilities may only be exacerbated when content filters are
156
mandated.
While it may be hard to sympathize with the prospect of increased
copyright infringement scrutinization over some of these largely
157
successful and profitable online content hosting platforms,
it is
important to note that any change to their business model would
fundamentally change the way many of the creators operate to keep
these platforms running.
2. Small to Medium-Sized Content Creators
Article 13 has the chance of decimating a legitimate industry,
including many European creators, by stopping small to mid-sized
creators from engaging in what is often their part-time or full-time job.
Both legitimate and illegitimate claims of copyright infringement are
bound to flare up under mandated content filtration systems, which will
constrain creators’ speech and innovation, much to the detriment of
their consumers’ desires. Indeed, these artists and creators currently
receive automated copyright infringement notices on their own creative
158
works and are often unable to reap the benefits of their work.
Additionally, as discussed above, famous copyright holders’
ability to negotiate greater remuneration amounts with content
platforms is troublesome for small to medium-sized creators. If famous
copyright holders can take a larger slice of the remuneration-pie, little is
left to compensate small to medium-sized creators for their work. Their
incentives to create are destroyed, thereby nipping potentially-great
156. Gerken, YouTube’s Copyright Claim, supra note 132 (discussing how YouTube and
other content hosts already face this issue and have few means of addressing it).
157. See, e.g., Roxborough, supra note 146 (discussing how the European Union wants a
different copyright regime from the United States by recapturing control of the internet from
Silicon Valley firms).
158. Tom Gerken, YouTuber in Row Over Copyright Infringement of His Own Song, BBC
NEWS (Jul. 5, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-44726296 [hereinafter Gerken,
YouTuber in Row].
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careers in the bud, and leaving less choice for consumers to enjoy
overall.
C. Why Does Identifying Winners and Losers Matter?
Identifying winners and losers illuminates a few scenarios which
may totally or partially play out upon the DSM Copyright Directive’s
pan-Europe implementation: (1) dominant technology firms will dictate
what content appears in search results and when it appears, (2) user
generated copyrighted content will be extremely difficult to access and
consume, and/or (3) a resurgence of piracy will afflict the internet once
again.
1. Disproportionate Control of Content Filters
In the first scenario, dominant technology firms will create and
control the few automated content filters that will be widely available
since it would be too costly and time consuming for a smaller or lessexperienced firm to create one. Because of this, these dominant
technology firms are incentivized to create non-net-neutral ‘packages’
that provide different capabilities at different price points for content
hosts to consider. For example, at an expensive price-point, a dominant
technology firm could offer a content filter that allows consumers to
either get exactly what they searched for (provided the content exists on
the platform) or provide results that the filter purchaser expressly
desires. At a lower price point, a dominant technology firm could offer
a content filter that provides consumers with results promoted by the
dominant technology firm, without any input from the content host.
Regardless, this will result in net neutrality violations to the detriment
of consumers.
This concentration of power over content filters may also
incentivize collusive price-fixing behavior between dominant
technology firms. Since these companies will know that the average
consumer has nowhere else to turn to search for their desired
copyrighted works, these dominant technology firms will be able to
charge copyright holders higher prices in exchange for inclusion within
search results. However, this is unlikely because such a move would
contradict the anti-trust principles that guide the European Union’s
159
internal market functions.

159.

See generally TFEU, supra note, 123 at art. 101, 102.

FINAL_FOR_JCI

96

10/7/2020 6:49 AM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 43:1

2. User-Generated Content Becomes a Thing of the Past
The second potential scenario created by Article 13’s
implementation, wherein user generated copyrighted content will be
extremely hard to consume, should also cause concern for net neutrality
advocates and small artist supporters alike. Under this scenario, the
business model of many well-established content hosts would no longer
be viable. This is because Article 13 would allow for lawsuits against
these content hosts whenever a user successfully uploads another’s
copyright-protected content to their platforms, and because small to
midsize creators would be disincentivized from creating.
To partially deal with this situation, these content hosts would
have to either buy (what are likely to be) expensive content filters, or
ban all content uploads from non-verified accounts. This less-expensive
second option would destroy small, unknown, or fledgling authors from
across the creative spectrum from sharing their creative content and
exacerbate the problem. Accordingly, this would help entrench
currently-famous authors’ positions as they would face little
competition for copyright consumption. The internet would then
become less creatively diverse and only populated by a limited amount
of creative content.
3. Resurgence of Piracy
The third potential scenario, in which piracy becomes a significant
problem on the internet once again, should make net neutrality
advocates nervous as well. If content filters are required to do business
in Europe and companies cannot rely on safe-harbor provisions, then
copyright protected content, in general, will become scarcer or more
expensive to access. If a consumer is unable to find the content they
desire at what they deem to be a reasonable price-point, they may turn
to piracy to satisfy their content-driven desires. This would only serve
to benefit torrenting websites and peer-to-peer networks, as they would
see a resurgence in users. All copyright owners would therefore be
harmed, as they would receive less remuneration and less control over
their works.
In the end, consumers will be most negatively affected by
implementation of Article 13’s anti-net-neutrality principles. Consumers
will be directed away from the content they originally sought out to
consume and could be redirected to similar content they did not wish to
consume. Online content hosts will be legally required to favor or block
particular content from consumption, or be forced into purchasing or
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developing their own expensive and anti-net-neutral content filters. In
turn, ISPs would possibly even be legally required to favor or block
particular content hosts altogether. In all, Article 13’s provisions would
give internet consumers less choice in what content they may consume
and when they may consume it. This expansion of copyright law is a
block on not only net neutrality, but also on consumer rights. In the end,
Big Tech may still prevail at the request and lobbying of famous artists
and their media publishers, contrary to the European Union’s desires.
V. ARE THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF EUROPE’S DSM COPYRIGHT
DIRECTIVE REALLY WORTH IT?
Balancing the concerns of authors, artists, publishers, and other
creative and tech institutions in the internet age with the rights of
consumers is certainly a difficult dilemma, but it is not a new one. If
this Directive was not adopted by member states and the debate ended
there, how would copyright holders have coped in this digital age?
When this Directive is enacted by member states, how would European
Union citizens, and by extension, consumers affected around the digital
globe, maintain their freedoms to make the consumer choices they
desire without substantial input from online content hosting platforms,
internet service providers, and governments that might not even be their
own? Luckily, a few snapshots of what might come-to-be in a world
where the DSM Copyright Directive exists.
A. Content Filters
As mentioned above, YouTube is facing issues with a litany of
falsified copyright infringement claims on their copyright-infringement160
detecting ContentID system.
This ContentID system utilizes both
algorithmic detection procedures and human flagging to identify
potentially copyright infringing content in a similar fashion to Article
13’s requirements. Neither algorithmic or human filtration on its own,
nor in combination, has proven to be trustworthy because each method’s
shortcomings are abused in a way that has drawn mass-scrutiny. Human
161
flagger system abuse foments black-mail and extortion, which are
rampant problems with little means of redress. Entire creator-backed
channels have been taken down and livelihoods have been destroyed
160. Gerken, YouTuber in Row, supra note 158.
161. ObbyRaidz, YOUTUBE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM IS CORRUPT (I WAS EXTORTED) W/
INTERVIEWS, YOUTUBE (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iNOYV3qC_GE.
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thanks to the human-flagger system. However, the algorithmic detection
portion of this system does not do much better.
YouTube’s algorithm-based ContentID system is similar to the
content filters that the DSM Copyright Directive calls to implement.
This algorithmic filter automatically determines whether a video
162
contains copyright infringing material.
If the filter concludes that
another’s copyrighted material is included in a video, the video may be
taken down and ‘strikes’ may be levied against the uploader, which can
163
eventually close their channel.
However, in this situation, the
identified copyright holder may choose to leave the video up and
164
redirect the advertising revenue to themselves, instead. While these
filters do not necessarily direct consumers away from the content they
wished to consume, it may do so, or it may redirect advertising revenue
away from where the consumer desired. This violates net neutrality
principles.
This system’s flaws are readily apparent. If the DSM Copyright
Directive is ratified by member states, similar systems will become
widespread and commonplace on internet traffic that stems from or goes
through the European Union. This may lead to ubiquitous acts of
blackmail, extortion, and general erroneous infringement claims that
hurt European and worldwide consumers. If Google’s $100 million, tenplus-year-old ContentID system cannot control these phenomena, then
the European Union and consumers cannot expect better results from
165
any other online content hosting provider’s system.
This flawed
filtration system may even become the go-to filter as no other
comparable systems exist to date.
The final wording of Article 13, as approved by the European
Union Parliament, shows that the European Union has attempted to
solve this issue. Drafters have suggested that courts should grant passes
to small online content hosting platforms that cannot afford to develop
an algorithmic filtration system for the first three years in which they
are in business if they make less than ten million Euros, and if they have
166
less than five million unique monthly visitors. This does not propose
162. Gerken, YouTuber in Row, supra note 158.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Paul Sawers, YouTube: We’ve Invested $100 Million in Content ID and Paid Over $3
Billion to Rightsholders, VENTURE BEAT (Nov. 7, 2018), https://venturebeat.com/2018/11/07/
youtube-weve-invested-100-million-in-content-id-and-paid-over-3-billion-to-rightsholders/.
166. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in
the Digital Single Market, Article 17(6), supra note 2 at 125 (final wording of Article 13 as
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an effective solution, however. In comparison to Google’s ten-year-long
ContentID system development, three years is too short to create a
comparatively effective system. Additionally, if and when a small
online content hosting platform eventually graduates into the ‘major
leagues,’ their efforts will be rewarded with a litany of lawsuits from the
copyright holders who have waited for the company to reach a size
worth suing. This could place these companies in danger of bankruptcy,
which would ultimately disincentivize their original creation. This
language therefore encourages these small online content-hosting
platforms to find ways to skirt the law in ways that are yet unknown,
remain small, or not be created in the first place. Thus, neither copyright
nor net neutrality principles will be encouraged.
B. Elimination of Safe-Harbor Provisions for Content Hosts
The DSM Copyright Directive’s safe-harbor provision elimination
for online content hosting platforms and ISPs should worry every
advocate for net-neutrality, free speech, and common-sense copyright
law. If these network owners can face legal consequences via
contributory copyright infringement for content uploaded by their users
and customers, they have a large incentive to become cyberspace’s
draconian secret censorship-police. This would effectively end the free
and open internet that much of the world has known since its inception.
This provision, in lockstep with the DSM Copyright Directive’s
implied requirement for automated content filters, would result in a
highly censored internet. This is what has spawned the “meme ban”
167
moniker for Article 13,
as it would stop most uses of copyright
protected images that viral memes rely upon. Considering the amount of
copyrighted material that is posted to the internet on a daily basis,
whether infringing or not, the DSM Directive may create a scenario
where network owners can be dragged into abundantly numerous
lawsuits for contributory copyright infringement. Since content filters
are not easily adaptable to non-infringing uses of copyrighted material,
it would be easy to imagine that these network owners would place a
general blanket-ban on the uploading of copyrighted materials in order
for them to enjoy the greatest amount of legal protections.
approved by the EU Parliament. Referred to as Article 17 in the latest proposal.); see also
Timothy B. Lee, European Governments Approve Controversial New Copyright Law, ARS
TECHNICA
(Feb.
21,
2019),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/02/europeangovernments-approve-controversial-new-copyright-law/.
167. Reynolds, supra note 95.
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What we are likely to see result from the elimination of safe harbor
provisions is an internet segmented into different packages that ISPs
and content hosts can offer to consumers. Different packages at
corresponding price points would allow access to greater levels or
different kinds of copyrighted materials. These network owners will
then be able to easily monitor uploads and downloads of copyrighted
materials, discriminate against violators, and ensure that all inclusions
of copyrighted materials are approved by their owners. Approval must
come before consumption through faulty automated upload and
download filters, regardless of lawful use. This may seem like a sound
protection of copyrights, but it is actually a net neutrality proponent’s
worst nightmare, made possible by an unsound expansion of the rights
granted by the proposed directive.
CONCLUSION
Expanding copyright protections under the DSM Copyright
Directive is not worth the likely impacts to the internet as it is now
known. This should cause concern for net neutrality supporters because
net neutrality stands for the principle that network owners should enable
access to all content and applications regardless of the source, and
168
without favoring or blocking particular products or websites. With a
segmented internet, most consumers would not have access to all
content and applications without regard to the source unless they have
the requisite funds. Such a segmented internet would make it less useful
as a tool to connect humanity’s knowledge, but the copyright holders
may exert a little more control over their intellectual property. On
balance, the DSM Copyright Directive is not a worthy endeavor.
If a net neutral internet is too at odds with copyright laws for some,
perhaps it is time to revisit the underlying concepts of copyright
protections and update them to the twenty-first century instead of
relying on an expansion of a twentieth century regulatory approach that
could cripple the internet. Countries and federations should strive to
keep the status quo that the early internet has enshrined: unfettered
access to the largest network of human knowledge that still provides
some protections to copyright holders without destroying the tool most
important to keeping humanity informed, connected, and democratized.
A net neutral internet is an economically viable one that protects human
rights. The DSM Copyright Directive is posed to destroy this.
168.

GILROY, supra note 12.

